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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE: COHERENCE OR CHAOS?
MICHAEL J. POLELLE*
I. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT GROWTH:
A SPUR TOWARDS EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
Collective bargaining for public employees will become an in-
creasingly important issue in that the largest and most rapidly grow-
ing business in the United States is that of government. In the early
1960's, more civilians worked for government than for the eight
largest corporations combined, and they represented 121/2 per cent
of the working non-military labor force in the land.' By 1975, gov-
ernment employment is calculated to increase up to approximately
fifteen million persons and to include one out of every five employ-
ees in the country.2
The growth of public employment at the state and local levels
has proved to be particularly extensive. While federal civilian em-
ployment as of 1965 had only risen by 200,000 individuals, or 13 per
cent from 1955, state and municipal employment increased at the
same time by three million new employees for a 65 per cent in-
crease.8 By 1975, it is projected that non-federal government em-
ployment will increase by 50 per cent;4 manpower requirements at
the federal level will be only one-sixth of the work force at the state
and local levels.5
Despite this massive growth in numbers of public personnel at
the state and local levels, those same levels of government will find
it increasingly difficult to recruit skilled and educated personnel with
present policies. The tendency of municipal government is to attract
* J.D. Harvard, 1963; LL.M. John Marshall, 1969; Ass't. Professor of Law De Paul
University College of Law.
1. Brinker, Recent Trends of Labor Unions in Government, 12 LAB. L.J. 13 (1961).
2. Stieber, Colective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 65-66 (L. Ulman ed. 1967).
3. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT INI 1966, at 1 (Series GE-No. 4,
1967). As of October, 1966, state and local governments in the United States accounted
for 8.6 million employees, whereas federal government accounted for only about 2.9 mil-
lion employees.
4. NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL, GOVERNMENT AND MANPOWER 24-29 (1964).
6. Supra note 2, at 66.
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moderately qualified personnel whose services are lost within a few
years by rigid tenure laws which push mediocre talent upward large-
ly on the basis of nonmerit considerations. The simple truth of the
matter seems to be that government is no longer considered a model
employer in regards to wages, hours, and working conditions.8 The
grim irony of this situation is that the country's biggest business has
the biggest potential source of employee grievances. It is clear, there-
fore, that future personnel conflicts within state and local govern-
ments are virtually assured. The security of government employ-
ment, so valued in depression days, is a commodity equally available
within the large corporate structures of today.7
The labor movement in the United States has not neglected the
glowing prospects for recruitment in the troubled public service.
Although experiencing sluggish growth in the private sector, unions
have been growing at a brisk pace in the public sector.8 In fact,
the unionization of the public sector is responsible for most of the
159,000 increase from 1964 through 1966 in white-collar union mem-
bership. Government unions at all levels increased by about 264,000
during this period.9 All in all, public employee unions now lead more
than 1.5 million government workers.' 0 The indications are that even
teachers at the college level will begin to unionize and seek the al-
liance of organized labor."'
The surge of public employee unionism is no historical accident.
It is fostered by many of the same catalysts that existed in private
industry. Although the public employee bargains in theory for his
individual employment contract, the realities of twentieth-century
life have, in fact, produced standardized contracts and working con-
ditions.' 2 It is inevitable, therefore, that personnel treated as a stand-
ardized group should seek leaders to represent common grievances.
This social phenomenon is no doubt part of the price paid for the
enactment of statutes guaranteeing equal treatment and uniform
6. MUNICIPAL MANPOWER COMMISSION, GOVERNMENTAL MANPOWER FOR TOMORROW'S
Crrx a 26-27, 72, 164 (1962).
7. "Government is also the largest business in the world. We must therefore be
competitive with other large businesses if we expect to attract to Government-and to
keep in Government-its proper share of the Nation's employment Pool." 107 CONG. REc.
864 (1961) (remarks of Senator Johnston).
8. Moran, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service-Massachusetts Style, 52 MASS.
L.Q. 163, 154 (1967).
9. Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1968, § 1, at 9.
10. Gamier, Pay Negotiation with Public Employees, in PRACTICAL GUIDELINES TO PAY
ADMISTRATION 118 (K. Warner & J. Donovan ed. 1963). Starting with fifty state em-
ployees in 1932, the American Federation of State. County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) grew to 220,000 within about 30 years and is today the largest single
union representing state and local employees. At the federal level the American Fed.
eration of Government Employees in 1966 had 270,000 members; the National Association
of Letter Carriers had 170,000; and the United Federation of Postal Clerks had 140,000.
At the state level AFSCME had 300,000 members in 1966. The International Association
of Fire Fighters had 115,000; and the American Federation of Teachers had 113,000.
11. BUs. WEEK, Dec. 3, 1966, at 92; Day & Fisher, The Professor and Collective Ne-
gotiations, XCV SCHOOL AND SOCIErY 226-29 (1966).
12. S. SPERO, GoVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 336 (1948).
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classification in the public service. The leaders of these uneasy pro-
fessional or quasi-professional public groups have come to identify
themselves as a "new breed" composed substantially of young men
who would rather fight the public service than quietly switch to the
private sector.1 s
II. EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION:
A SPUR TOWARDS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The growth of the public service, its increased needs for skilled
and professional personnel, and the expansion of unionism among
growingly irritated public personnel have provided pressure for col-
lective bargaining in the public service; the ultimate objective of
which is a comprehensive code of public employee labor law in each
of the states.14 It is clear that sooner or later states with large
working forces of state and local employees must face the reality
of the powerful social and economic drive for the legitimization of
public employee collective bargaining. The only real question is how
these states will adapt to public employee collective bargaining and
the organizational power behind that bargaining.
The issuance of Executive Order 10988 in 1962 initiated the im-
petus for public employee collective bargaining at the federal level. 5
The Executive Order provides for three forms of union recognition:
(1) Exclusive; (2) Formal; and (3) Informal. Exclusive recognition
requires a union to be chosen by a majority of the employees in
a unit; should less than 50 per cent vote for one organization, a
majority of those voting will suffice, provided that the number vot-
ing is considered "representative" which usually means that at
least 60 per cent of employees in the unit must cast ballots. For-
mal recognition exists only in the absence of qualifications for ex-
clusive recognition; representation must consist of not less than 10
per cent of the employees in a unit. An exclusively recognized union
is entitled to negotiate an agreement, whereas a formally recognized
union may only demand to be consulted from time to time and to
present its views in writing at all times. Unions of less than 10 per
cent representation receive only informal recognition. Informally
recognized unions may only present their views; they need not be
negotiated with or even consulted. Each agency determines: 1)
13. F. LUTZ & J. AZZARELLI, STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN EDUCATION 44 (1966); CCV NA-
TION, Sept. 25, 1967, at 260'.
14. Zander, Trends in Labor Legielation for Public Employees, 83 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
1293, 1296 (1960).
15. Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962). See 90 MONTHLY LAB. REV. I,
III-IV (1967)-It Is interesting to note that by 1966, there were some 911,000 federal
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements; however, 290,000 of these em-
ployees were within the Post Office Department, Studies show that with the exception of
the Post Office Department, only two out of ten federal white collar workers and one
out of three blue collar workers are yet organized.
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whether a unit is appropriate for exclusive recognition; and 2)
whether a union seeking exclusive recognition has secured a major-
ity within the unit. Upon request of either the agency or of a union
qualified for formal recognition, advisory arbitration is used to de-
termine the appropriate unit and the majority status of the union.16
The scope of negotiation under Executive Order 10988 is limited.
The representative of an exclusively recognized union has the right
to "meet at reasonable times and confer with respect to personnel
policy and practices and matters affecting working conditions, so
far as may be appropriate subject to law and policy requirements.""
The obligation of the federal employer, however, does not extend to
"such areas of discretion and policy as the mission of an agency,
its budget, its organization and the assignment of its personnel,
or the technology of performing its work." 18 In addition, federal
management officials reserve the right to direct, hire, promote, trans-
fer, assign, suspend, demote, or take other disciplinary action against
employees." The federal agencies also retain the right to lay off
employees due to lack of work or other legitimate reasons, maintain
the efficiency of government operations, determine the methods,
means, and personnel in the conduct of such operation, and take
whatever emergency actions are required to fulfill the mission of
the agency. 20 The usual subjects of negotiation include: discussion
about grievance procedures; promotion and demotion practices;
leave-taking policies; reduction-in-force practices; work environ-
ment; supervisor-employee relations; safety and health programs;
and employee services. 2' Although budget matters cannot be nego-
tiated, federal employees, whose salaries are determined by "pre-
vailing wages," have negotiated agreements which grant union par-
ticipation in local wage surveys. 22 Negotiated agreements may also
provide for grievance arbitration; however, this restricted arbitra-
tion is advisory and extends only to the interpretation and applica-
tion of the agreement or agency policy, but not to substantive
changes.2 3
Whatever may have been its original motivation or support, Ex-
ecutive Order 10988 is undergoing increasing criticism. The major
point of attack has been that the executive order provides no effec-
tive solution for a negotiation impasse.2 4 The problem is not, so
16. Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, §§ 3(a)-6(a), 11 (1962).
17. Id. at § 6(b).
18. Id.
19. Id. at § 7(2).
20. Id.
21. 90 MONTHLY LAB. REV. I, iii-iV (1967).
22. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE,
LATE SUMMER 1964, at 28 (1965).
23. Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, § 8(b) (1962).
24. Hart, The Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Civil Service, 19 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 175, 176 (1966) ; Wrtman, Labor Relations in Government Servioea---Collec-
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much, one of contract enforcement, as it is of merely obtaining any
agreement from a recalcitrant agency. There is no procedure of ef-
fective power relationships to induce concessions from a federal
agency. Not only is it a felony to strike against the federal govern-
ment,'2  but Section 2 (1) of Executive Order 10988 also denies the
privileges under the order to any organization which asserts a right
to strike against the federal government.2 0 The Executive Order it-
self makes no provision for mediation, conciliation, fact finding, or
even advisory arbitration of a negotiation impasse. Investigation
indicates dissatisfaction with non-binding grievance arbitration and
with the lack of centralized interpretation of Executive Order 10988.2?
Consequently, it is no surprise that a growing swell of criticism
has led to congressional soundings in this area. Representative
Daniels (Dem. New Jersey) stated in Congress on January 17, 1967:
The entire purpose of H.R. 10988 was to drag the manage-
ment of the Federal Establishment into the 20th century, so
far as its relationships with labor were concerned. In far too
many cases, management has refused to be dragged... 2 8
The trend of development at the federal level is to expand Executive
Order 10988, especially in the area of enforcement and impasse pro-
cedures. States, which contemplate legislation, might well take heed
of the defects in Executive Order 10988, which stem from a failure
to deal with the deadlock of spirited negotiations. 29
At the present time the newest developments in the area of pub-
lic employee collective bargaining are taking place at the state level.8 0
The significance of this trend lies in the industrialized nature of the
governmental units which have legislated some type of collective
bargaining for their public employees. States such as California,
tive Bargaining Strategies and Tactics in the Federal Civil Service, 15 LAB. L.J. 482,
492 (1964).
25. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1918 (1970).
26. Federal Personnel Manual, ch. 711, §§ 1-2 (c) Exec. Order No. 10988, 27 Fed.
Reg. 551, § 2(1) (1962). Striking against the United States is a prohibited practice, which,
if not stopped, could result in the suspension or termination of union recognition under
Executive Order 10988, 28 Fed. Reg. 5127, §§ 3.2(b)(4), 3.4 (1963).
27. Wortman, Federal Civil Service Bargaining, 89 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 659, 660
(1964) ; Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 16 LAB. L.J. 685,
692 (1965).
28. 113 CONG. Rzc. 704 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Daniels).
29. Wortman, Labor Relations in Government Services--Collective Bargaining Strat-
egies and Tactics in the Federal Civil Service, 15 LAB. L.J. 489, 490' (1964). Congress is
currently considering a National Public Employee Relations Act, H.R. Doc. 17383, 91st
Cong. 2d Sess. (1970).
30. Some 16 states have adopted specific legislation which, in one form or another,
not only permits the organization of public employee unions, but also provides for some
manner of mandatory collective bargaining specifically designed for some or all public
employees. This does not include states which have a limited form of negotiations for
employees of public utilities of state-operated mass transit systems. It also excludes
those few states where public employees are merely confirmed by statute in their pre-
existing right to Present individual grievance. The public employee unions, however, are
not satisfied with the minimal approach adopted by most of these statutes. Newscast with
Jerry Wurt, President of AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Mutual Broadcasting System, Nov. 7, 1967.
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Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have already found it necessary
to adopt public employee bargaining laws. These statutes cover a
wide area of negotiable subjects. They provide for the determination
of bargaining units and for representative elections of bargaining
agents. They also employ mediation and fact-finding as a means of
dispute settlement. Wisconsin has placed supervision of its legislation
under the aegis of a separate agency, the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission, formerly known as the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, which deals only with labor problems of the
public sector.31 The other states have placed supervision in already
existing agencies, such as the state department of labor relations or
the state mediation board.3 2 Of the states adopting bargaining laws,
it is not accidental that at least half of the states are urbanized,
industrialized, and heavily populated.
Only four states have enacted general statutes in express oppo-
sition to a policy of organization and representation. Although Texas
allows union membership among public employees, it is against the
public policy of that state for an official to enter into a collective
contract with a public employee union or even to recognize the union
as a bargaining agent.3 3 Any such collective contract is deemed null
and void.3 4 Virginia goes somewhat further by declaring it against
public policy for an official to recognize or negotiate with a public
employee union, although employees may join an organization unaf-
filiated with the labor movement and which does not claim the right
to strike.33 North Carolina probably takes the severest position of all
by prohibiting public employees from joining any labor organization
and by rendering null and void any contract with a labor union. 6
Finally, Alabama forfeits the benefits of its state employees under
the state merit system if they should join a union.3 7 Employees of
cities, counties, and boards of education are exempted from the
stringent penalty of forfeiture.
The classical argument against collective bargaining in the pub-
lic service has been that it would derogate from the sovereignty of
the state. The sovereignty objection would have greater validity if
government were coerced in some way, but it has been sufficiently
observed that the sovereign may freely agree to be bound by a cer-
31. Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 111 (Supp. 1971).
32. K. WARNER & M. HENNESSY, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AT THE BARGAINING TABLE 91
(1967).
33. TEXAS STAT. ANN., art. 5154c (Vernon's 1971).
34. Id.
35. VA. SESS. LAWS, Joint Senate Resolution No. 12 (1946).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 95, art. 12 (1965).
37. ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 317(2) (1960).
38. A-LA. CODE Ut. 55, § 317(3) (1960).
PUBLIc EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
tain procedure in the exercise of its discretion.3 9 Once having de-
cided to accept the principle of collective bargaining, the state may
legitimately decide to exercise its discretion in one way rather than
another. If government can and does negotiate on an individual basis,
it is difficult to distinguish collective negotiations on grounds other
than convenience. State authorities have customarily contracted for
the construction of public works, the purchase of land, engineering
services, personal service contracts, surveys and numerous other
matters. Often the contracts extend beyond the budget period of the
municipality; yet it has never been suggested that such contracts in-
fringe the sovereignty of the state.4 0 Nor is it easy to find any un-
due delegation of sovereignty where any terms of agreement are ar-
rived at jointly and freely and not at the unilateral dictation of a
private group. This scarcely seems to delegate more authority than
does the commonly accepted principle of a government unit which
binds itself to pay a prevailing wage.
A further argument has been made that the existence of legis-
lation, such as school codes and civil service laws, prevents collec-
tive negotiations. It must be remembered, first of all, that not all
municipal and local public employees are covered by school codes
or complex civil service regulations. Secondly, the nature of the leg-
islation needs to be examined. The real test is whether the legislation
involved is so specific as to exclude negotiation or bargaining. It
is true that most tenure, retirement, and pension laws are so detail-
ed that they leave little room for negotiation. On the other hand,
state legislation relative to salaries and working conditions of pub-
lic employments has traditionally been sufficiently general so that
fruitful negotiations can take place about specifics.4 1
III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
A SPUR TOWARDS THE STRIKE
The most advanced legal devices for collective bargaining in the
public sector will prove a Pandora's box unless some attention is
given to the power relationship behind collective bargaining. Author-
ities in the area are questioning the practicality of an elaborate col-
lective bargaining structure which refuses to deal with the realities
of bargaining power.4 2 A National Institute on Collective Negotia-
tions in Public Education concluded with a "growing acceptance"
of the proposition that the right to strike is necessary to collective
39. W. VOSLOO, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
19-20 (1966).
40. Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 1961, Wis. L. REv. 601.
41. Seitz, Rights of School Teachers to Engage in Labor Organizational Activities, 44
MARQ. L. REV. 36 (1960).
42. F. LUTZ & J.AzZARELLI, STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN EDUCATION 8 (1966) ; W. VOSLO0,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 35 (1966).
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negotiations in the public service.4 3 Inevitably, one must explain
why the right to strike, so prized in the early days of the labor move-
ment in the private sector, is not equally to be expected in the early
days of organization among public employees.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that modern public employ-
ee laws for collective bargaining, even with sophisticated devices for
arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and fact-finding, have caused the
rash of strikes in the public sector to abate-to the contrary, there
were only 15 work stoppages involving 1,720 public employees in 1958,
while the United States experienced 414 public empkyee strikes in-
volving some 160,000 workers in 1969. Federal employees, for the
first time in history engaged in five work stoppages during 1968 and
1969." Ronald W. Glass of the Department of Labor traces part of the
increased teacher militancy to recent state legislation which guar-
antees public employees the right to organize and bargain.45 One
observer, having noted that Michigan has endured about twenty-
four public employee strikes since 1965, concludes:
Granting the right to engage in collective bargaining by
public employees and then denying them the right to strike
is like inviting a child to a candy parlor without allowing the
child to taste the candy. The right to engage in collective
bargaining assumes by tradition of even the least sophisti-
cated the right to fight to support one's demands. 6
Similar legislation in Wisconsin resulted in accelerated union de-
mands of about 20 million dollars per year, or about ten times as
much as the annual settlements in prior years, with a consequent
backlog of impasse situations which overtaxed the fact-finding pro-
cedures of the state.47 It seems clear that not even modernized
bargaining laws have caused unions to forsake the ultimate weapon
of the strike.
In the United States, public employee strikes have been declared
illegal at every level of government. 48 Government in this country
has never conceded the right of its employees to strike and has had
43. Potts, A Summer School Course in Teacher Negotiations, 89 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
847 (1966).
44. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT: 1958-68, at 9 (1969) ; U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, WORK STOPPAGES IN 1969, at 2 (1970').
45. Of the thrity-three teacher stoppages in 1966, twelve occurred in Michigan, shortly
after passage of the Michigan Public Employment Relations Act in 1965. Chicago Daily
News, Sept. 13, 1967, at 3; Glass, Work Stoppages and Teachers: History and Prospect,
90 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 43, 45 (1967).
46. Clary, Pitfalls of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 18 LAB. L.J. 406,
408 (1967).
47. Krause, The Short, Troubled History of Wisconsin's New Labor Law, 25 Pus. AD.
REV. 302, 305 (1965).
48. Pollsar, Public Employees and the Right to Strike, in STRIKES AND SOLTIONS 1(K. Warner ed. 1968).
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ample common law authority to quell such strikes even without spe-
cific anti-strike legislation. 49 The federal government leaves no doubt
concerning its attitude on the subject. An individual, who participates
in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the United States
Government may not accept or hold a position in the federal serv-
ice.50 Anyone who violates this prohibition commits a felony with a
penalty of not more than $1,000 fine, or imprisonment for not over
a year and a day, or both. 51 At the state and local level there are
currently at least thirty-five states which have proscribed strikes of
some or all public employees by an affirmative act such as the
passage of legislation, court decision, or opinions of attorneys gen-
eral. Generally these strike prohibitions apply to all classes of pub-
lic employees in all circumstances. The most notable exception con-
sists of governmental proprietory functions, such as public utilities
or mass transportation systems, especially where the system were
originally privately owned before being taken over by the govern-
ment.
However, the states and their political sub-divisions differ in the
penalties they attach to the breach of an anti-strike policy. The
harshest sanction imposed is modeled after the federal statute men-
tioned above. Another type of sanction is the use of job forfeitures
and suspensions for various periods of time. Sometimes striking em-
ployees are not to be rehired at a wage higher than when they went
on strike. Other states require that retired strikers be placed on pro-
bation for certain periods of time with their wages frozen at the
strike-time level for a certain period. Of course, court injunctions
are always available in those states where no specific penalty at-
taches to the strike prohibitions.
There have been several arresting developments at the non-fed-
eral level. Puerto Rico, for example, specifically recognizes in its
constitution the right to strike against government agencies operat-
ing as private businesses, but the freedom of the legislature is re-
served to handle emergencies threatening the maintenance of es-
sential public services.5 2 A 1967 Vermont statute provides:
No public employee may strike or recognize a picket
line of a labor organization while performing his official
duties, if the strike or recognition of a picket line will en-
danger the health, safety or welfare of the public. The pub-
lic employer concerned may petition for an injunction or
49. See Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615 (S.D. W. Va. 1970) ; Board of Ed. of Com-
munity Unit School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 37 Il. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) ; Head
v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 288 Minn. 496, 182 N.W.2d 887 (1970) ; City of Minot v.
General Drivers and Helpers Union No. 74 of Minot, 142 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 1966).
50. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7311 (1967).
51. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1918 (1970).
52. PUERTO RICO CONST. art. 2. § 18.
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other appropriate relief from the court of chancery within
the county wherein such strike or recognition of a picket
line in violation of this section is occurring or is about to
occur.5"
Although Puerto Rico makes its distinction turn on the nature of
the government service and Vermont is concerned with the effect on
the public, each allows sufficient flexibility to deal with emergency
situations.
Pennsylvania implemented an all-encompassing Public Employ-
ee Relations Act in 197054 which duly prohibits strikes by prison
guards, mental hospital workers, and court personnel. All public em-
ployees in Pennsylvania are barred from striking during the pend-
ency of collective bargaining negotiations under the law. Other than
these exceptions, public employees are free to strike "unless or un-
til such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the
health, safety or welfare of the public. '5 5 However, no public em-
ployee is entitled to pay or compensation during any strike, and if
the strike is illegal, the law provides for criminal fines and injunc-
tive relief. Finally, an unfair practice by a public employer is not
a defense to a prohibited strike.
There have been three court decisions which in some way lend
support for public employee strike rights. The court in Los Angeles
Metropolitan Transit Authority6 allowed a strike against the public
corporation which ran the Los Angeles system of public transpor-
tation on the ground that the Los Angeles Metropolitan Trans-
it Authority Act embodied a Norris-LaGuardia clause 57 allowing
"concerted activities" for mutual aid and protection and contained
no specific anti-strike provision. This decision, though limited on its
facts to striking transit workers, has aroused support and opposition
concerning the possible consequences of its rationale. The other two
decisions are even more easily distinguishable and are not firm sup-
port for a right to strike.5
The reaction of foreign governments to public employee strikes
is a constructive contrast to the usual reaction in the United States.
Strikes of Norwegian public employees are allowable on condition of
a three-month notice. Strikes are not prohibited by the Australian or
53. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1704 (1967).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, ch. 19 (Supp. 1971).
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1971).
56. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Bd. of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d
684. 355 P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960).
57. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 102 (1965).
58. Local 266, AFL v. Salt River Project, 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954). A strike
against a proprietary function of the state (a power district) is not against public policy
in that the function of the power district was to serve its owners (consumers) not the
public.
Board of Education of City of Minneapolis v. Local No. 63, AFL, 233 Minn. 144, 45
N.W.2d 797 (1951). Employees of a school district are not "charged with duties relating
to public safety" and as such are not specifically forbidden, by statute, to strike.
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French governments except that in France neither police nor high-
ranking officials may strike. Great Britain, though having no spe-
cific legislation against such strikes, reserves the right to dismiss
public employees if necessary.5 9
Canada has recently enacted the most interesting legislation of
all in the area of the public employee strike. The Public Service
Staff Relations Act,60 assented to on February 23, 1967, provides that
either party may notify the Public Service Staff Relations Board of
a collective bargaining impasse and may request either binding ar-
bitration"' or conciliation for the settlement of disputed terms or con-
ditions.62 If the Chairman of the Public Service Staff Relations Board
decides conciliation would not be helpful, or seven days after the
finding and recommendations of the conciliation board have been re-
ported, employees of a bargaining unit then have the right to strike.83
All other public employee strikes are prohibited under the Ca-
nadian legislation. Fines for a prohibited strike carry maximum
penalties of $100 for each striker; $300 for each union officer who
counsels, procures, or authorizes a prohibited strike; and $100 each
striking day for every employee organization that declares or author-
izes a prohibited strike.6 4 Either the public employer or the bar-
gaining agent may apply to the Public Service Staff Relations Board
for a declaration that an actual or proposed strike is or would be
prohibited. The Board then may make such a declaration." It is un-
clear what would transpire if one party chose the route of binding
arbitration and the other party chose the strike route.
Nevertheless, this writer has not discovered any public employ-
er strike legislation other than the 1970 Pennsylvania legislation,
which so directly confronts the problem and so adequately counter-
poises conflicting interests as does this Canadian legislation. The
fact is that most legislation in the United States has expended its
creative efforts, if any, on the subject of collective bargaining and
has been content to fulminate against any and all public employee
strikes without much observable effect. The use of the public em-
ployee strike is admittedly an area of genuine concern.
The proportions of the increasing strike problem should not be
exaggerated. Popular journals often tend to unduly emphasize the
59. Brinker, Recent Trends of Labor Unions in Government, 12 LAB. L.J. 13, 79
(1961), citing N. POWELL, PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN GOVERNMENT 295 (1956).
60. Public Service Staff Relations Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 72 (1967).
61. Id. at § 63.
62. Id. at § 77.
63. Id. at § 101. Employees of a bargaining unit may not strike if there is not a
collective agreement in effect; the impasse has taken the route of binding arbitration;
or the employees have duties necessary to the safety or security of the public. It Is also
required that employees belong to a unit with a certified bargaining agent before they
have the right to strike.
64. Id. at 104.
65. Id. at 103.
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threatening aspects of public employee strikes. In 1969 there were
5,700 work stoppages in the United States but only 414 in the public
sector. The total work stoppages involved about 2,481,000 employees
and these specifically in the public sector involved only some 160,000
workers. Overall there were about 42,869,000 man-days idle in 1969
due to work stoppages, which represented .24 per cent of the esti-
mated total working time. The man-days idle for public employee
strikes in that year accounted for about 745,000 man-days idle, or
only about .02 of the estimated total working time available.16
The trend in this unstable area of labor relations appears to be
one of increasing public employee strikes of rather short duration and
often termed "professional protest" or "sick leave protest." Unlike
his compatriot in private employment, the public employee does not
possess much economic leverage against the state. Most public em-
ployees are vulnerable to replacement and are incapable of causing
direct financial injury to a specific public agency which does not
operate on a profit system in a market economy and has no cus-
tomers to lose. Above all, the public employee must be sensitive to
the generally hostile mood of an inconvenienced public. As a result,
public employee strikes are generally a study in public relations and
political pressure rather than a case of direct economic power ap-
plied decisively against an employer. In such a situation, bluff and
the threat of a strike are almost as important as the strike itself.
It seems likely, therefore, that the law will have to come to
terms with the use of the strike in the public sector. Either public
employee strikes must be effectively stopped or they should be legit-
imized in some manner. Even were the first course desireable, it is
unlikely that government can or will make the public sector strike-
free without unacceptable consequences. It is improbable that in-
junctions will be any more omnipotent in the public sphere than they
were in the private sphere at a time when unions were not nearly
so well organized as now. Despite absolute strike prohibitions, it is
the ability of militant unionism, to achieve results, which has con-
vinced teachers to take to the union path. The conclusion of Euro-
pean experience is that a militant civil service has been able to ob-
tain settlements more speedily than have workers in the private
sphere. The pattern of activity in the recent past is such that public
employee strikes and work stoppages have generally led to union
victories and not to penalties or serious resistance. Jerry Wurf, Pres-
ident of AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has stated:
Strike prohibitions are not simply ineffectual, though they are
66. U.S. DEPT. OF I.ABOR, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT: 1969, at 3, 6 (1970). See
also Nolan & Hall, Strikes of Government Employees, 1942-1961, 86 MONTHLY LAB. RIv.
52 (1963).
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undeniably that. What is far more serious, they warp this
vital process. They bring employees to the bargaining table,
but as inferiors. Simultaneously they provide false reassur-
ance to management representatives and induce less than
genuine negotiations.6
7
It is sometimes suggested that the answer to the increasing fre-
quency of public employee strikes is the use of compulsory arbitra-
tion. However, compulsory arbitration will not and cannot be a com-
prehensive solution for the striking public employee. The basic fact
is that traditionally, both unions and management have been opposed
to compulsory arbitration. 8 There is absolutely nothing to indicate
that either government or the unions, both for legal and practical
reasons, will leave basic terms of a contract in the hands of a third
party. It can only be academic to assume that compulsory arbitra-
tion should be applied in the public sector when it has been so firm-
ly rejected in the private sector. Basically, compulsory arbitration
is seen at best as an unpleasant but necessary surrogate for the
basic right to strike. 9
The literature in the field all too often fails to note the differ-
ence between compulsory arbitration of rights under a given contract
and compulsory arbitration of interests in the absence of a contract.
The arbitration of rights has proved far more successful in the pri-
vate sector for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, basic in-
terests will rarely be left to a third party decision which of neces-
sity will be broadly stated and not confined to narrow issues more
readily rationalized and interpreted within the framework of a writ-
ten document. Furthermore, the possibility exists that compulsory ar-
bitration will blunt good faith bargaining with the fears that any of-
fer or compromise by either party will weaken its position before
the arbitrator. Experience also indicates that arbitrators frequently
proceed from the last stated position and not from a position made
but abandoned in negotiations. Finally, unlike typical litigation, the
parties to compulsory arbitration must live together. An unhappy
litigant could cause continuing unrest. The mutual acceptance of the
arbitration decision is an important factor, whether the arbitration
be voluntary or compulsory.
67. Cr PROBLEMS OF 1967, at 45 (W. Buildinger ed. 1967).
68. Fiester, The Case Against Compulsory Arbitration, pamphlet reprint from AMERI-
CAN FEDERATIONIST (Oct. 1965); Phelps, Compulsory Arbitration: Some Perspectives, 18
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 81 (1964).
69. Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Service, 17 LAB. L.J. 138, 147
(1966).
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IV. CONCLUSION:
A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
It is evident that the drive for collective negotiations by public
employees will continue. It is also clear that the demands of public
employees for collective negotiations will be a perennial and increas-
ingly serious problem until it is squarely faced and resolved. The
anonymity and standardization of a burgeoning public service has
engendered resentment among public employees. State and local em-
ployees especially find themselves mistrusted by the public, ignored
by a bureaucratic hierarchy, and embittered by alleged faster gains
in the private sphere. In an age where modern business strives to
develop a feeling of participation among employees, state and local
government managers are still accustomed to issue unquestioned or-
ders to educated employees of professional or semi-professional cal-
iber.
Only the legislature is equipped to deal with the scope of the
problem involved. The precise machinery of negotiation to be estab-
lished in a state must be sufficiently flexible to permit a form of
collective negotiation fitted to the needs of the parties. Existing leg-
islation in the United States provides an essential base by often pro-
viding for collective bargaining, representation elections, mediation,
and fact-finding. However, it often provides no guidance concerning
the identity of the public employer in a given situation.
The danger is that public employees will endure needless frus-
tration in trying to determine which government spokesman has the
authority in a particular situation. This ambiguity could be allevi-
ated by having personnel representatives and budget representatives
participate in initial negotiations. Such an approach would help to
prevent conflicts with state budgets or state civil service laws before
positions become entrenched. The effective date of any legislation or
portions thereof should be prospective so as to allow a gradual psy-
chological and administrative transition and adjustment.
Most terms of employment, excepting the statutory proscription
of the union and closed shops, should be left to solution by collec-
tive negotiation. However, financial and political realities in many
states would seem to dictate that wage negotiation be subject to a
more regulated procedure. Any wage agreement reached at the state
or local level should probably be subject to approval by the financ-
ing body or some committee thereof. The effect of approval would
be an informal guarantee that sufficient funds would be available
to affirm the negotiation promised. Logically, the body which prom-
ises should have the authority to finance its promises. Secondly, wage
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negotiations should be geared to the legislative appropriating process.
Wage negotiations, for example, could be required to commence at
least ninety days before the submission date of an agency budget,
and if no agreement were reached within thirty days, the statute
would automatically set in motion the process of mediation, concili-
ation, and advisory fact-finding, if such machinery had not been in-
voked earlier by either party.
There is even a more basic suggestion to be made concerning
public employee strikes. A fundamental premise of this article is
that the absolute strike prohibition has almost always failed. Its
further fitful and ineffectual use will serve only to embarrass polit-
ical authority and legal theory. Few public officials will rigidly en-
force an anti-strike law for the sake of a legal nicety where they do
not feel a genuine threat exists to the public welfare. The most
promising solution from a legal viewpoint is for the enactment of
qualified public employee strike laws that are more likely to be en-
forced. Even under the Taft-Hartley Act, distinctions are drawn be-
tween strikes in the nature of a national emergency and those that
are not, on the basis that government intervention is justified only
where public interest is at stake. 70 Public employees could be divid-
ed into three categories. The first category would involve essential
services, such as law enforcement or firefighting, and would be sub-
ject to compulsory arbitration in lieu of the strike right. The second
category would include public employees, such as sanitation workers
and school teachers, who would enjoy a qualified right to strike. The
third category would consist of nonessential employees who would
be allowed an unqualified right to strike.
The recent Canadian legislation in this area could be used as a
framework. 71 In order to be certified, a union would be obligated to
include in any collective agreement a declaration of its intent to be
bound by the qualified strike laws of the particular state in question.
Strikes would be in no event allowed during a contract period, or
where mediation, conciliation, or fact-finding was in progress. Strikes
would also be absolutely prohibited as to fire-fighters, law enforce-
ment officials, and other specifically designated classes of public em-
ployees whose services are vital for social functioning, but mediation,
conciliation, fact-finding, and if necessary, compulsory or advisory
arbitration would be available at the request of either party in place
of the strike. Illinois, for example, already provides for firemen's
arbitration boards which render advisory decisions in matters of
70. See Foegen, A Qualified Right to Strike--in the Public Interest, 18 LAB. L.J. 90,
98 (1967). President Nixon sought recognition of a limited right to strike in the transpor-
tation industry so long as national health or safety was not endangered. Whlte House
Press Release (Feb. 3, 1971).
71. See CAN. REV. STAT. c. 72 (1967).
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wages, hours and conditions of employment.72 A Public Employee
Labor Relations Board 5 could be empowered in its discretion to as-
sess fault in its fact-finding and to hold either private or public
fact-finding hearings. It is essential that at least part of the Public
Employee Labor Relations Board be composed of nongovernmental
members, so that it is not viewed as a biased tool of the public
manager. The Board would be obligated to constantly re-evaluate its
classification of essential employees and to make periodic recommen-
dations to the state legislature for inclusion or exclusion in view of
administrative experience.
Subject to the general rule that only a duly certified employee
organization could do so, a certified bargaining agent would be al-
lowed a qualified right to strike after approval of two-thirds of the
voting membership at a strike election held under the auspices of
the Public Employee Labor Relations Board. Armed with this qual-
ified strike right, a certified bargaining agent would have two al-
ternatives in the event of a negotiations impasse. The choice of al-
ternatives would be solely the prerogative of the bargaining agent
since it would be bound by its choice for the period of contract
negotiations. The first alternative would be conciliation followed by
fact-finding and then by compulsory or advisory arbitration of dis-
puted issues. A qualified strike of not over one month would be al-
lowed only in the event that the state or local authorities refused
arbitration or refused to honor the reward. The other alternative
would be conciliation followed by fact-finding and then an immediate
right to a qualified strike not in excess of one month. The period of
one month is chosen on the theory that most public employee strikes
are even of shorter duration when allowed to run their natural
course. Every qualified strike would require a period of notice, per-
haps two weeks, so that public services are not cut off by surprise.
Mediation machinery should be available at any stage and regard-
less of what alternative is chosen.
At all times, either during or after the one-month period, the
Public Employee Labor Relations Board would retain the authority
to declare a strike officially terminated, after public hearings and
findings on the basis of substantial damage to the public health, wel-
fare, or safety. The test of a qualified strike should not be based on
the severe principle of "inconvenience" to the particular public serv-
ice being performed. Every strike by nature causes some inconven-
ience and obstruction to the immediate function involved. The test
must not be a mechanical one which necessarily always decides for
72. ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 10-3-8, 10-3-10' (1962).
73. This board could be modeled after the Public Service Staff Relations Board estab-
lished by the Public Service Staff Relations Act § 11, CAx. REv. STAT. C. 72 (1967).
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the public employer but one which acknowledges that conflicting in-
terests must be weighed and evaluated in light of the public "health
and welfare."
Occasional demand for a strike beyond one month could be met
by placing the burden on the bargaining agent to show that the pub-
lic health, welfare, or safety would not be damaged or unreasonably
threatened by such a strike. A union, for example, might try to pro-
long its strike time by making provision for a skeleton staff or by
agreeing to carry on with particularly necessary functions. Either
party would have the right to apply to the Public Employee Labor
Relations Board for a declaration that an actual or proposed strike
is or would be illegal. Of course, the Board would also reserve the
right to act on its own initiative in the case of an actual strike. A
determination by the Board that a particular strike was or was not
illegal under the indicated test should be subject to judicial review
under the provisions of a state administrative review act. It should
be made clear that a declaration of public emergency by the chief
executive should be allowed to override a declaration of the Board
which did not find a public emergency. In this manner, the Board
would be ultimately subject to the highest elected official of the pub-
lic. It is unlikely that a chief executive of the applicable govern-
mental unit would lightly enter into the hornet's nest of a public
employee strike without compelling cause.
The penalties to be imposed on a union which violates a quali-
fied strike could provide for graduated options. The machinery of dis-
pute settlement could be suspended in the discretion of the Board.
The union could also be punished either by loss of its certified status
for a certain period or by fines directed at the union treasury.
Moreover, any collective agreement obtained perchance during a
prohibited strike should be declared null and void by statute. Its
terms would have to be renegotiated either when the public employ-
ees returned to work or during the course of a legally qualified
strike. A prohibited strike should be declared an unfair practice.
Moreover, the Public Employee Labor Relations Board should be
able to issue cease-and-desist orders against a prohibited strike and
to seek injunctions in support of such orders. The finding and im-
prisonment of individual employees or leaders should be used as a
last resort.
To sum up, the present system of most states in dealing with
public employee bargaining and striking is doomed to inefficiency,
inequity, and failure. The proposed suggestions offer no guarantee
of success. They do, however, attempt to build a system upon a basis
of honest compromise so that all interests have some stake in pre-
serving the law. The future of public employee labor law cannot be
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built on abstract shibboleths, such as state sovereignty or the inal-
ienable right to strike anytime, anywhere, but on a realistic apprais-
al and creative compromise of whatever interests are involved. It is
fundamentally unrealistic to allow the right to organize and the right
to negotiate or bargain, whether expressly or impliedly, without ex-
pecting to seriously deal with the issue of public employee strikes
and the regulation of such strikes.
